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Abstract 
In the run up to the 2014 European Parliament elections, the new Spitzenkandidaten process 
and European-wide party campaigns were considered a mechanism to create a more engaged 
European public. However, right-wing Eurosceptic party groupings gained a significant 
minority of the seats in the 2014 EP elections. We place this in the context of media and 
public sphere dynamics of politicised EP elections that have given selective salience to 
Euroscepticism. We discuss two interrelated media biases that explain this convergence of 
public debates towards Euroscepticism: a media negativity bias in the selection and tonality 
of EU news and a media polity bias that privileges contestation of the constitutional make-up 
of the EU over political and policy-based debates. To investigate these media biases 
empirically, we analyse EP election news during the 2014 European Parliament elections, 
taking Germany and the UK as ideal-type cases. We find that the UK news demonstrates a 
strong negative bias towards the EU polity, whereas in Germany EP debates focus more 
strongly on EU politics and policies and in fact demonstrate a positivity bias with regard to 
assessments of the legitimacy of the EU polity.  
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Introduction 
In recent decades, increasing opportunities for contestation between parties in the EP has 
been seen as a key strategy for promoting EU-level participation, thus strengthening EU 
democracy. In this vein, the 2014 EP election introduced the new Spitzenkandidaten strategy 
in which the main party groupings in the EP selected leading candidates for European 
Commission President. This strategy was intended to encourage debate ‘about politics in, not 
only of, the EU’ (Follesdal & Hix, 2006, p. 554). Introducing an element of competition over 
political office would thus trigger ‘government-opposition’ conflicts at EU level and 
encourage citizens to express preferences towards EU policies or politicians (Hix & Marsh, 
2007; Hobolt, 2014). The democratic legitimacy of the EU would thus be enhanced through 
Europeanised public spheres in which EU actors are visible and EU issues are debated and 
contested (Koopmans & Statham, 2010; Risse, 2010).  
 
However, Eurosceptic parties achieved unprecedented success in the 2014 elections. Right-
wing Eurosceptic party groupings altogether gained a significant minority of the seats – the 
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), formed by former British Prime Minister 
David Cameron in 2009, won 70 seats (9.32 per cent), and two newly formed groups – 
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) and Europe of Nations and Freedom won 
48 (6.39 per cent) and 39 (5.2 per cent) respectively. Even though the salience of the EU in 
the news increased between the 2009 and 2014 EP elections, (Kleinnijenhuis & van 
Atteveldt, 2016), this politicisation of the EU in public debates is often driven by more 
fundamental conflicts about EU constitutional issues, the EU’s external relations or crisis (de 
Wilde et al., 2013; Hutter et al., 2016). The intended politicisation of the EP elections has 
therefore not necessarily happened along the left/right spectrum but along identitarian lines 
(Grande and Kriesi 2015, Hooghe and Marks 2009). Public debates in different national 
contexts can thus also converge on Euroscepticism and not on the Spitzenkandidaten who are 
more likely to campaign on a party political basis rather than contest European integration as 
such. Through salience given to Eurosceptic actors and debates over the legitimacy of the 
EU, Europeanisation of EP election campaigns can take place in such a way as to contribute 
to the development of ‘Eurosceptic’ public spheres (Bijsmans et al., 2017; Gattermann & 
Vasilopoulou, 2017). We explore the way in which different national public spheres can 
shape the politicization of EP election campaigns in ways not always complementary to the 
objectives of the Spitzenkandidaten strategy. 
 
To do this, we explore two interrelated public sphere and media biases that account for the 
convergence on Euroscepticism in public debates about the EU: a bias towards negativity in 
the selection and framing of EP election news and a bias towards polity contestation over 
policy or political contestation. Here, we speak of ‘media bias’ in relation to the agenda 
setting role and priming effects of the media (Entman, 2007). Selection and framing 
mechanisms apply in decisions about what kind of news items to prioritise: bad news over 
neutral or good news, partisan coverage or ‘horse-race’ news about candidates over policy 
issues (D'Alessio & Allen, 2006; Niven, 2001). Both negativity and polity biases in the media 
representation of EU elections allow us to distinguish  EU politicisation as a case of 
‘opposition of principle’, which represents EU politics primarily as a struggle over national 
interests and systematically disregards partisan competition about politics and policies (de 
Wilde & Trenz, 2012). 
 
In our comparative content analysis of EP election news coverage in the UK and in Germany, 
we shed light on the key differences in media selection and framing as a main characteristic 
of the differentiated politicisation of European public spheres (De Wilde et al. 2015). In the 
case of the UK, the success of UKIP in 2014, and by extension the vote to leave the EU in 
2016, is explained in the context of a strong negative bias in relation to EU polity debates, 
whereas in Germany negativity is primarily related to debates about EU politics and policies. 
In fact, we find that German news demonstrates a positivity bias in the context of debates 
about the EU polity. The article therefore contributes to our understanding of the importance 
of media biases in the analysis of politicised European election campaigns and argues for an 
inclusion of tone and type of conflict into studies of partisan contestation of the EU. We go 
beyond existing studies of negativity in the context of EU news by examining the intersection 
of tone with types of conflict. With an original dataset, we argue that negativity in the 
German context is part of partisan democratic politics at EU level, which is met with a 
positivity bias in relation to the EU polity, but it contributes to the fundamental 
delegitimization of the EU in the UK.  
 
Taking media logics seriously  
 
When considering the role of the media as a driving force of EU politicisation, the focus is 
often laid on external mobilisation strategies of political actors. European public sphere 
researchers assume that political parties and candidates can impact on public opinion by 
making their claims visible in the media  (Koopmans & Statham, 2010). The greater visibility 
of EU and European actors in the public debates the more Europeanised the public sphere is 
considered to be (see also Risse, 2010). Regarding the 2014 elections, scholars have found 
wide variation in visibility of the lead candidates across the EU (Hobolt, 2014, p. 1534). 
There are also differences in the scope of articles – Schulze (2016), for example, finds that 
German journalists are more likely to write about the EP elections from the perspective of EU 
actors, whereas the UK coverage is predominantly national. Media salience of EU actors is 
further found to correlate with a better knowledge of candidates and a higher likelihood of 
turning out to vote (Gattermann et al., 2016; Schmitt et al., 2015).  
 
EU politicisation is however also shaped by internal media logics. Journalistic practices of 
news selection and framing account for systematic biases in the way political actors are made 
salient and meaning is attributed to EU stories. Media frame analysis has contributed to our 
understanding of Europeanisation as the convergence of meaning structures across national 
public spheres (Risse, 2010; Sifft et al., 2007). The framing of Europe constructs European 
identity and accounts for shifting patterns of support and opposition to European integration. 
When news stories focus on the Euro crisis, for instance, the visibility of candidates in EU 
news is not an indicator of support for European integration but often generates opposition or 
enhances Eurosceptic attitudes (Kleinnijenhuis & van Atteveldt, 2016). In the same vein, the 
news coverage of the EU crisis is found to give selective salience to Eurosceptic actors and 
lower visibility to EU actors and their policies (Boomgaarden et al., 2013, pp. 621-623). EU 
politicisation does therefore not necessarily lead to a more Europeanised public sphere, but is 
rather a symptom of growing Euroscepticism in the media and the national framing of EU 
debates (Brüggemann & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2009, p. 40). To understand the 
development of politicised EU elections in the context of growing Euroscepticism, it is, 
therefore, necessary to consider not only exogenous mobilisation strategies of political 
parties, but also how endogenous media logics contribute to the shaping of public discourse 
about the EU (de Wilde et al., 2013). We therefore suggest taking media autonomy seriously 
and turn towards the role of the news media as a driver, amplifier and interpreter of EU 
contestation (Statham & Trenz, 2012).  The focus then shifts to understanding the work of 
journalism and its potential biases as important intervening variables that shape political 
discourse about the EU. 
 
We discuss two potential biases of EU news coverage that drive EU politicisation in partial 
independence of the campaigning efforts of political parties and candidates or the 
Spitzenkandidaten strategies. The first media bias relates to the tonality of the debate. One 
consistent finding across news formats and cultures is that bad news is more newsworthy 
than good news (Soroka, 2014). This is an incentive for journalists, who work in an 
increasingly competitive environment, to apply negativity filters to political news as a way to 
increase the value of their product (Galtung & Ruge, 1965). Of particular relevance for EU 
coverage is that media negativity relates, in particular, to foreign news coverage where other 
criteria for news selection (like familiarity, personalisation, or cultural proximity) are less 
readily available (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; de Vreese & Kandyla, 2009; Entman, 2004). 
Attention to distant events is more easily drawn when stories convey a notion of threat or 
when the integrity of particular actors and institutions can be undermined. Negativity can 
lead to distrust in politicians, political cynicism and depress political engagement (Cappella 
& Jamieson, 1997), particularly negativity that focuses on strategy or personal characteristics 
of candidates (Crigler et al., 2006).  Indeed, scholars have analysed the tone of EU news and 
found that exposure to negative evaluations of the EU leads to more support for Eurosceptic 
parties (van Spanje & de Vreese, 2014).  
 
Following Lengauer et al. (2011), we distinguish between overall non-directional negativity 
and directional negativity targeted towards different types of actors. Our first hypothesis is 
therefore that a media negativity filter applies in the overall framing of EU news stories and 
in the selection of statements from political actors.  With regard to generic news framing, we 
expect to find an overall non-directional negativity bias in news stories and sources (H1a), 
suggesting a general preference for bad news over good news, for example, stories and 
sources that discuss crisis or failure instead of success. As a result, journalists would display 
a preference for overall negatively framed news stories (story-level negativity) as well as give 
preference to negative quotes from political actors (source-level negativity). In line with 
expectations regarding negative tone towards candidates, we also expect to find a tendency 
for domestic and EU political actors and parties to be discussed negatively in articles and 
sources through directional negativity (H1b). Drawing on our country-based expectations and 
to explore the differentiated role of national public spheres, we further expect that in 
countries which are favourable to integration and have highly Europeanised public spheres 
(Germany), actors who discuss the EU negatively will be foreign, whereas in countries which 
are less Europeanised but discuss the EU in dominantly negative terms (UK) the debate will 
be mainly driven by domestic actors with only low salience given to foreign actors (H1c). 
Increasing the media salience of the EU through politicised EP elections, then, would result 
in more negativity about the EU. Negative tone alone does not, however, necessarily mean 
that the EU is delegitimised. Indeed, negativity in news can be understood as a form of 
democratic accountability (Soroka, 2014). In the context of elections, negativity in the form 
of coverage slanted towards one candidate over another can also mobilise turnout and 
promote political knowledge and awareness of candidates (Dunaway et al., 2015; Scheufele, 
2008). It is therefore important to interpret media negativity in relation to a second potential 
media bias, which involves the type of conflict amplified by the media.  
 
In the EU setting, such an element of fundamental conflict is introduced by translating 
politics into polity contestation. Rather than promoting contestation between European 
political candidates, European elections are often found to debate questions of membership or 
‘different visions of democracy in the European Union’ (Hobolt, 2014, p. 1538; see also 
Treib, 2014). According to Mair (2013, pp. 109-110), national politicians intentionally focus 
on such polity issues during EU elections, issues upon which the EP is ineffective, while 
debating the EU polity is avoided during national elections when there could be an impact on 
the choice of government and its EU preferences, in order to avoid external constraints. The 
news media are, however, also found to play an active role in amplifying such fundamental 
polity conflicts (de Wilde et al., 2013). National media has also been found to ignore the 
‘everyday’, ‘bread and butter’ politics of the EU and focus instead on crises, EU summits and 
further integration (van Noije, 2010). 
 
Accordingly, our second hypothesis is that a ‘media polity filter’ applies to the framing of EU 
news stories and selection of sources in a way that challenges the legitimacy of the EU in 
fundamental terms. As a result of this second bias, journalists would relate EP election news 
articles to the constitutional make-up of the EU, often but not necessarily in nationalist terms 
or through identity conflicts, rather than ideological or partisan contestations, and select 
sources that discuss the EU in these terms (H2a). They would also disproportionately rely on 
sources from Eurosceptic/populist actors who generally contest the EU in these terms, rather 
than those interested primarily in discussing EU policy choices such as mainstream EU actors 
(H2b). Promoting partisan competition during EP elections would thus increase the 
predominance of EU polity rather than policy contestation, turning the multi-dimensional 
field of EU electoral politics into a bipolar constellation in which national self-determination 
and EU sovereignty fundamentally oppose each other.  
 
The question is how these two systematic media biases are amplified during EP election 
campaigns, particularly in relation to the new Spitzenkandidaten concept which was intended 
to a) enhance the legitimacy of the EU system and generate trust in EU institutions and b) 
open an arena of politics driven by partisan contestation over EU policies and candidates. To 
explore the relationship between these two biases, we distinguish between negativity in the 
context of normal political debate over politics or policy and negativity in the context of EU 
polity contestation. Existing studies of negativity in EU news coverage do not take account of 
these different manifestations of negativity in this way (Usherwood & Wright, 2017). While 
negative tone towards the EU polity does not necessarily reveal a negative evaluation of 
European integration, it nevertheless deviates from electoral contestation that is expected to 
control EU policies or reflect EU partisan politics and not to engage in system opposition. To 
further identify between negativity that fosters distrust in the EU, we introduce an additional 
concept which modifies Easton’s (1965) concepts of ‘specific’ and ‘diffuse’ support to 
differentiate between ‘specific’ negativity directed towards the EU’s institutions or 
representatives or ‘diffuse negativity’ towards a vague or general notion of ‘Europe’ or 
‘Brussels’. Diffuse negativity towards the EU is considered to be more damaging for EU 
legitimacy than specific negativity which may indicate dissatisfaction with particular 
institutions but not necessarily a delegimisation of the integration project as a whole. Our 
third hypothesis therefore relates to the country differences in our case selection: we expect 
that the negativity bias remains specific and confined to the level of EU partisan and policy 
contestation in articles and actor statements in contexts where support for the EU remains 
high (the case of Germany) (H3a), but expect that diffuse negativity and a ‘negative polity 
bias’ applies to news stories and the selection of sources in contexts where support for 
European integration is generally low (the case of the UK) (H3b). 
 
In the following, we wish to consider how media biases shape public debates and 
campaigning in different countries. In the case of the Spitzenkandidaten, we expect that 
national media contexts impact on coverage EP candidates receive. In Germany 
Euroscepticism receives relatively little support by political parties and the media. There has 
traditionally been a strong pro-European consensus amongst German political elites, who 
have considered the country to be the ‘Musterknabe’ (model boy) of European integration 
(Lees, 2002) and resulted in generally positive messages about the EU in the German media. 
Germany has thus been viewed as having a strong ‘European vocation’ where German and 
European interests overlap (Paterson, 2011). Furthermore, the two main Spitzenkandidaten - 
Martin Schulz and Jean-Claude Juncker - were German-speaking and regularly gave 
interviews in German, which is expected to assist their inclusion in the German media. 
Nevertheless, the newly formed Alternative for Germany (AfD) won seven seats in the 2014 
election. While the party could, at the time, be categorised as a ‘soft Eurosceptic’ party 
(Arzheimer, 2015) the result was nevertheless significant in a country with a long-standing 
pro-European consensus.  
 
The UK, however, has long been considered the EU’s ‘awkward partner’ (George, 1994) 
with traditionally high levels of Euroscepticism. In 2014, UKIP was a growing challenge to 
the mainstream parties and in 2013 David Cameron had promised to hold a referendum on 
EU membership should the Conservatives win a majority in the 2015 general election. The 
UK’s liberal media system has a long history of negative coverage of the EU, exercising 
‘destructive dissent’ in their reporting of European integration (Daddow, 2012), particularly 
as a result of newspaper ownership becoming concentrated in a small number of billionaire 
proprietors who have ideological and financial reasons for opposing the EU. Compared with 
other countries, British EU correspondents have less knowledge of the EU institutions and 
EU politics (van Noije, 2010, p. 261). Although the UK press has been described as the ‘most 
parochial’ in the EU (Pfetsch et al., 2004), the looming possibility of a referendum and the 
salience of the Euro crisis in recent years would be expected to have increased the visibility 
of EU issues in the UK press during the 2014 election campaign. At the same time, although 
they speak English, both Spitzenkandidaten were ‘foreign’ for the UK and neither have 
strong connections to the country. While the two country studies cannot be generalized across 
the EU-28, they can serve as ideal-type cases that demonstrate the relationship between the 
two media biases of negativity and polity contestation.  
 
Operationalisation 
 
To account for a media negativity bias as an element of news coverage of EP election 
campaigning we analyse tonality at two interrelated levels: a) story-level negativity (as 
attributed to the journalists); b) source-level negativity (as attributed to particular actors in 
their statements covered by the news). Adapting the standardised coding instructions from 
Lengauer et al. (2011), we rank the tone of journalistic story-telling on a scale from negative 
(-1), neutral/ambivalent (0) to positive (1). A set of indicators for negative and positive tone 
(such as failure, crisis, frustration, etc. vs. success, achievement, enthusiasm) was used to 
support the coders’ choices. We code for overall non-directional negativity, as well as 
negativity directed at different actors, that is, whether a negative story targets its negativity at 
the EU (in a ‘specific’ or ‘diffuse’ way), or towards domestic national, opposition or populist 
opposition actors (here, actors such as UKIP in the UK or AfD in Germany). Coding for 
directional tone allows us to differentiate between stories or statements that are generally 
negative but, for example, attribute blame for crises to national governments, and those that 
are negative in tone towards EU actors or institutions. This allows us to differentiate between 
general negativity and negativity most likely to provoke diffuse anger or distrust in the EU 
specifically.  
 
In addition to this basic coding at story level, we measure the statements of particular actors 
quoted in the articles along the same criteria, thus shifting the emphasis from the positive or 
negative framings of EU news stories by journalists to the dimensions of actor contestations 
in the news. Borrowing from claims-making analysis (Koopmans & Statham, 2010), we also 
code for type of actor (government, legislative, etc.) and scope (e.g. EU, national). We also 
code for actor country as well as party family along the lines of radical and populist right, 
conservative, liberal, social democrat, green and radical and populist left1. We are thus able 
to show to what extent news coverage in the member states awards high salience to 
radical/populist right actors, and whether the coverage of EP election campaigning focuses 
primarily on the EU or national representatives. 
 
To account for the polity bias, we use generic frames to measure the dimension of articles 
and actor statements along the conflict lines of policy, politics and polity, and scope of article 
(EU, national, other EU member state, etc.). These are not particular story lines or 
interpretive frames to be reconstructed through qualitative discourse analysis (see Patterson, 
1 We adapted Statham et al.’s (2010) categorisation of party families, including under ‘radical or populist right’  
parties such as UKIP and the AfD to the right of mainstream conservative parties. Radical/populist left would 
include parties such as Die Linke in Germany and Syriza in Greece. 
                                                 
2000, p. 11), nor a measure of evaluation or opinion, but a simple measurement of the 
conflict dimension. Generic frames have the advantage of providing a reliable measurement 
for cross-national comparative analysis: they directly test thesis and antithesis in our 
variables and they are irrespective of specific topics and actors. Articles and actor statements 
were coded as EU polity if they dealt with issues relating to the institutional make-up of the 
EU, its competences, authority or membership. EU and national politics related to the ‘horse 
race’: articles focused on candidates or partisan competition. Articles and statements were 
coded as policy when they related to the shape or application of particular policies or 
regulations. These frames were coded independently of tone but allow us to identify those 
instances where negativity emerges in the context of polity debates – thus raising issues 
concerning legitimacy and the future of integration – and where it is rather part of ‘normal’ 
political contestation.  Variations along this variable are used to demonstrate not negative 
opinions but how negative tone intersects with the conflict dimension to support particular 
types of campaign in EP election debates.  
 
To apply this codebook, we analyse news articles about the EP elections in Germany and the 
UK from a three-week period spanning the elections of 22nd-25th May 2014, including two 
weeks prior to and one week following the elections in order to capture the period in which 
they were most salient in the news. We collect articles from six newspapers: the two most 
visited online left-leaning and conservative-leaning quality newspapers and the most visited 
tabloid-style newspaper from each country via the European Media Monitor and online 
archives. This includes welt.de, spiegel.de and bild.de and guardian.co.uk, telegraph.co.uk 
and dailymail.co.uk. While this study comprised part of a wider project looking at online 
news and user engagement, which dictated the need to analyse online news websites with 
comments sections, the selection of platforms also provides the widest possible breadth of 
coverage in terms of political leaning. All articles dealing centrally with the EP elections are 
selected for analysis, including news and opinion articles but excluding interviews. We took a 
random stratified sample by newspaper of 50 per cent of the articles collected to manage the 
volume of articles. Altogether, 335 articles and 1128 actor statements were coded by a team 
of four coders applying Krippendorff’s alpha for reliability tests (Hayes & Krippendorff, 
2007). Inter-coder reliability tests were conducted on 30 articles. As there is no official 
acceptability level, we accepted the score of .60 for the tone as a case of exploratory coding 
(De Swert, 2012), which has been common practice in a number of other studies (see e.g. van 
Spanje & de Vreese, 2014). Tone variables ranged from .67 to .83. All other variables ranged 
between .73 and 1.00. Reliability was further enhanced through team coding, regular 
discussion and checking of problematic cases, as well as a final coding check by us. 
 
Findings 
 
The media negativity bias 
 
Partially confirming hypothesis H1a, a non-directional negativity bias in political news 
persists in both countries and across news formats at story-level (see Table 1). There are no 
significant differences between countries2, meaning that, journalists generally display a 
negativity bias in writing bad news over good news and in the selection of sources who speak 
negatively about issues. At source level, however, there is a small but significant difference 
between countries, with UK journalists using more generally negative quotes. With regards to 
directed tone in articles and sources,  hypothesis H1b is also only partially confirmed, but the 
country difference lies elsewhere. At story-level and source-level, we find no significant 
differences between countries3 regarding tone towards domestic government and domestic 
Eurosceptic/populist parties, although the UK media tends to be more positive and generally 
gives UKIP far more attention than the German press gives the AfD. Generally speaking, 
journalists favour negative stories and sources about government and Eurosceptic/populist 
parties. 
 
It is only when we look at negativity towards the EU that the two countries differ 
significantly: In the UK, articles are generally found to be much more negative towards the 
EU institutions and actors than German news, where tone towards the EU is balanced (p 
<.001, Somer’s d = -.220).  There are also significant country differences in the way selected 
actors evaluate the EU (p<.001, Somer’s d = -.334). In the German newspapers, we find a 
positivity bias, with a third of quotes coded as positive. In the UK newspapers, almost half of 
the quotes were negative towards the EU with just one in ten coded as positive. German 
journalists therefore tend to quote actors who discuss the EU and its actors in an affirmative 
2 Story-level overall tone: p = .587, Somer’s d = -.031; source-level overall tone: p<.005, Somer’s d = -.113 
3 Story-level government tone: p = .167, Somer’s d = -.095; domestic Eurosceptic tone: p = .057, Somer’s d = 
.155. Source-level government tone: p = .122, Somer’s d = .98; domestic Eurosceptic tone: p = .428, Somer’s d 
= -.054 
                                                 
way, thus constituting an exception to negativity as a news value. British journalists instead 
confirm the general negativity trend by selecting predominantly quotes from actors who 
evaluate the EU in negative terms. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Furthermore, when we look at the way in which different types of actors discuss the EU, we 
also find clear differences between countries4 (see Table 2). In the UK, EU, European 
national and domestic actors tend to discuss the EU in predominantly negative terms. In 
Germany, all actors except for those from other member states tend to discuss the EU 
positively. When it comes to EU actors specifically (e.g. MEPs, EU officials, 
Spitzenkandidaten), over 40% discuss the EU or its actors and institutions in positive terms, 
compared with the UK, where similar numbers discuss the EU in predominantly negative 
terms, something which can be explained by the high number of Eurosceptic MEPs quoted in 
the UK news. Thus, H1c is confirmed and demonstrates that negativity about the EU from 
actors is a predominantly foreign phenomenon in the German news. Furthermore, this 
suggests that increasing the presence of EU actors in the news does not necessarily lead to 
more positive impressions of the EU. Rather, national attitudes towards the EU shaped by 
both journalists and domestic political actors continue to interfere with the two media biases 
in shaping the representation of the EU in national public spheres. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The media polity bias 
 
According to our polity bias hypothesis, the salience of the EU in the news alone is not a 
sufficient measure of a politicised campaign. Rather, the type of conflict presented is key. We 
find a highly significant difference between the two countries (p < .001, Cramer’s V = .399, 
see Table 3). Hypothesis 2a regarding a polity bias in generic article framing and source 
selection is only confirmed for the case of the UK where almost half the articles discuss the 
EU in polity terms compared to just over a quarter in Germany. Some of this relates to David 
Cameron’s promised referendum on EU membership, which made the EU membership issue 
highly salient, but also to the emphasis placed on more fundamental questions of institutional 
4 Germany: p = .000, Cramer’s V = .276. The test for the UK could not be carried out due to insufficient 
numbers in all categories.  
                                                 
make-up, bringing the legitimacy of the EU into question instead of adding a politics 
dimension to the EU. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
While EU politics failed to resonate in the UK, journalists allow EU politics to unfold in 
Germany by opening up an arena of partisan contestation. Issues in other EU member states 
are also considerably more salient in Germany than in the UK, which primarily results from a 
focus on Euroscepticism in Germany as a ‘foreign’ problem. In neither country, however, are 
EU policy issues raised often. Altogether, almost half the articles in Germany related to 
European politics and policies, compared with just one in ten for the UK, where such issues 
were often transformed into polity contestation. Whereas the German media therefore engage 
with democratic politics at an EU level, the UK primarily focuses either on national politics 
or a fundamental questioning of the UK’s membership. At the source level, there are also 
significant country differences, with UK journalists displaying a preference for actor 
statements which contest EU legitimacy in fundamental terms (p <.001, Cramer’s V = .325). 
It becomes evident that the proportion of actors discussing EU polity issues is significantly 
higher in the UK than in Germany (see Table 3). One in five actors in the UK news discusses 
European policies and politics compared with over 45% in the German news.  
 
However, the EU polity contestation bias is also driven by the decision to include certain 
kinds of actors most likely to contest the legitimacy of the EU. We therefore confirm H2b and 
find a tendency on the part of journalists to amplify the voice of Eurosceptics. To remove the 
effect of the different parties in government, we condensed party families into two categories: 
mainstream and radical/populist. We find that, while the UK quotes more radical/populist 
parties, there is a disproportionate space given to them in both countries, amounting to a 
small but significant country effect (p <.001, Phi = .-141). The Eurosceptic voice in the 
media is most dominant in the UK where a third of all party actors are from UKIP or other 
radical/populist parties. In Germany, less than one in five statements can be attributed to the 
radical/populist actors (although this compares to just 7.1 per cent of the voting share that 
went to AfD) (see Table 4). If we look at the types of Eurosceptic actors who appear in the 
media we find, however, again in line with H1c, a striking difference between both countries. 
Whereas the German press, it was the newsworthiness of foreign Eurosceptic actors (in 
particular Le Pen and Farage) that makes a difference (p < .001, Cramer’s V = .363), UK 
journalists tend to quote radical/populist actors at all levels (p < .005, Cramer’s V = .164), but 
almost half of all EU actors quoted in the news belonged to radical right/populist parties. The 
goal of politicised EP elections to develop into partisan contestation between parties at an EU 
level therefore backfires in the UK and transforms into polity contestation between EU 
actors. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
A negative polity bias? 
 
Our final hypothesis explored country-specific manifestations in the interaction of these two 
media biases. With regards to the H3a, we confirm that negativity towards the EU in 
Germany remains largely confined to partisan and policy contestation. In the German news, 
we do not find a statistically significant bias at story level when discussing the EU in general, 
diffuse terms (and the majority of diffuse articles are neutral), reflecting the general pro-EU 
consensus among political elites (Figure 1). When the EU is discussed in specific terms, there 
is a very slight negativity bias in the German articles. The positivity bias already identified 
amongst German actors grows when we look at issue dimensions at the source level (Figure 
2). In debates about the EU polity, almost half of statements are positive about the EU. Only 
when it comes to debates about EU policies does negative tone predominate. This finding 
suggests that negativity about the EU in Germany rather relates to the shape and direction of 
policy as well as the powers or roles of specific institutions rather than as part of bigger 
debates about European integration as such.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
We also confirm hypothesis 3b. In the UK we find significantly more specific negativity and 
significantly more diffuse neutral/ambivalent tone at the story level (p < .005, Somer’s d = 
.286). Thus, less diffuse negativity does not translate into more positivity in the UK news, but 
more ambivalence. When the EU is discussed in specific terms, there is a very clear 
negativity bias in the UK news with over half of articles coded for EU tone identified as 
negative. At the source level, actors in the UK press generally speak negatively about the EU 
whether the tone is specific or diffuse and regardless of the dimension. In debates about the 
EU polity, over half of all statements are negative. In other words, we find that EU negativity 
in the German news is part of the critique of EU actors, institutions and policies, whereas in 
the UK negativity is specific, directed against a diffuse idea of Europe and part of polity, 
policy and politics debates. We therefore demonstrate that in Germany Euroscepticism 
abroad is met with a defence of the EU at home, alongside discussion about EU politics and a 
contestation between Spitzenkandidaten. In the UK, the relatively high salience of the EU in 
the 2014 transforms, contrary to the intended effects of EP politicisation through elections, 
into a negative polity campaign that delegitimises the EU in the public sphere.  
 
Conclusion: news media and the selective salience of Euroscepticism 
 
In comparing EP election campaigns in the UK and in Germany, we have considered media 
tonality and framing as central for understanding the media coverage of EP elections. We go 
beyond existing studies of EU politicisation by exploring the relationship between media 
negativity and type of conflict. We demonstrate that overall, the dominant form of media 
contestation and negativity fails to meet the conditions for enhancing EU representative 
democracy in which EU political choices are debated across the member states. We found 
that a double media bias applies to EU election news. Firstly, EU campaigners faced a 
general negativity bias in the form of filters that select and frame EU news in a dominantly 
negative tone. Although in Germany directed tone towards the EU tended to be positive or 
neutral, the tendency for selecting bad news over good news generally means that the EU will 
be reported in terms of ‘crisis’ or ‘failure’ instead of successful outcomes or achievements 
and results in high visibility of Eurosceptic actors. 
 
Secondly, we show that EU politicisation in the context of EP elections can also undermine 
the legitimacy of the EU in systemic terms through a polity bias, instead of promoting 
partisan competition in the form of Spitzenkandidaten campaigns. While a polity bias does 
not necessarily indicate negative evaluations of European integration as such, when EU 
negativity intersects with polity debates the news media risks systematically translating EU 
legitimation campaigns into Eurosceptic opinion. There would be, in other words, a media-
driven ‘spiral of Euroscepticism’ that amplifies negativity towards the EU, bringing 
Eurosceptic actors and discourses effectively to the enhanced attention of Eurosceptic 
audiences (De Vreese, 2007). This explains why, from a perspective of German media, the 
UK debate becomes highly newsworthy. News media facilitate the transnational diffusion of 
Euroscepticism, contribute to the prominence of their leaders and set the agenda for a type of 
polity contestation that, instead of holding political candidates and their policies accountable, 
launches a polity debate that does not come under the remit of the European Parliament and 
can challenge the democratic legitimacy of the EU.  
 
Apart from this tendency towards negative polity campaigning, politicisation is found to 
differ between and within member states – a process of ‘differentiated politicisation’ (de 
Wilde et al., 2015). By focusing on Germany and the UK we selected poles among the 
member states where we could expect high variation in the media coverage of EP election 
news. In the case of Germany, the floor was opened for EU partisan, Spitzenkandidaten-led 
campaigns, with a high degree of attention to EU politics and policy. However, while 
German journalists paid relatively little attention to domestic Eurosceptic actors (the AfD), 
they regularly covered EU polity debates in other member states and quoted Eurosceptic 
foreign actors, finding, therefore, Euroscepticism newsworthy and making Nigel Farage and 
Marine Le Pen ‘prominent’ in Germany. Eurosceptics thus entered the German debate 
through the backdoor of foreign news coverage which was met with an elite ‘positivity bias’ 
at home.  
 
In sharp contrast, there was a highly pronounced negative polity bias in the UK news. The 
news media gave considerable voice to radical/populist actors and excluded voices that 
defend the principle of European integration. UK press coverage of EP elections is thus 
characterized by an excess of negativity and the almost complete absence of affirmation both 
by journalists and political actors. What is striking in the UK coverage is the deeply biased 
journalism which not only fails to cover the different sides of the political spectrum in EU-
level elections but also overtly amplifies and supports domestic Eurosceptic positions. The 
UK media debate is in this sense characterized by a Brexit consensus. We therefore show that 
the EU membership question was highly salient during the 2014 EP election and that the 
news media in the UK has contributed to an environment that facilitated the 2016 vote to 
leave the EU. 
 
On the one hand, our findings provide new evidence that confirms our expectations of the 
German and British media landscapes in relation to EU affairs: the generally pro-European 
consensus in German media and the hostile media environment in the UK. On the other hand, 
we provide a detailed and original dataset that demonstrates that negativity is not a 
straightforward news value and its direction is context-dependent. Journalists in Germany 
show a preference for bad news over good news, write negatively about government and 
opposition actors, but reveal a positivity bias in relation to the EU. In the UK, the negativity 
filter holds across the board, including in relation to Eurosceptic parties - despite the 
generally Eurosceptic tendencies in the UK media environment. It is in combination with the 
polity bias that negativity in the UK becomes highly damaging to EU legitimacy. 
 
Finally, we can contribute to the debate on the still largely unexplored normative implications 
of differentiated politicisation. In light of the fragmented media landscapes in Europe, 
reception contexts differ widely, which poses a challenge to European campaigners who enter 
the arena as Spitzenkandiaten for European executive office. If “different ‘Europes’ are 
demanded by different people, in different settings” (de Wilde et al., 2015, p. 15), the 
Spitzenkandidaten will find it hard responding to demands voiced in fragmented national 
arenas of contestation. The normative implications of these findings go, however, beyond 
simple technical issues of campaigning. Our findings also imply that the same opportunity for 
democratic authorisation and control leads to very diverse responses in terms of the dynamics 
of public contestation. When filtered through the news media European campaigns empower 
actors unequally: those actors who frame the EU dominantly in negative terms are rewarded 
with media attention. This does not mean that the positions of such EU polity contestants are 
also legitimised by the news media. Yet, the Eurosceptics are the most successful media-
agenda setters and as such are able to affect the course of the debate in important ways by 
discussing the limits of sovereignty transfer and questions of membership instead of EU 
politics and policies.  
 
The patterns of differentiated politicisation found in a two country-comparison limit 
generalisability. We can assume from our most different case design that similar media biases 
in EU news coverage apply in different countries and with regard to different news formats. 
Yet, politicisation yields quite different results in each national context. While democratic 
innovations such as the Spitzenkandidaten might be generally well received in countries with 
generally pro-EU media systems, in countries with more substantive public and media 
Euroscepticism such measures may serve primarily to undermine the EU’s legitimacy. Our 
analysis of election campaigns is also limited to a single moment of time where politicisation 
can be expected to result in parallel peaks of attention. We do not seek to measure an increase 
of EU politicisation over time but would expect that patterns of politicisation are even more 
differentiated in routine periods when attention is not focused on European elections. Our 
findings also cannot be considered as an indicator for predicting voters’ preferences. We can 
expect, however, that for the voters who receive information about the EU primarily through 
the mass media, it makes a decisive difference whether mediated conflicts remain within the 
ambit of electoral contestation of candidates or whether they challenge or undermine the 
legitimacy of the representative system of democracy as such. In this last sense, the relative 
success of Eurosceptic parties in the elections and the media biases that applied are closely 
related. 
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Table 1: Tone 
 
  
  
  Article Tone Actor Tone 
 
  German News UK News German News UK News 
 
Overall tone       
 
Predominantly negative 47.8% (77) 51.1% (89) 35.5% (149) 45.6% (323) 
 
Neutral/ambivalent 43.5% (70) 40.2% (70) 42.1% (177) 37.3% (264) 
 
Predominantly positive 8.7% (14) 8.6% (15) 22.4% (94) 17.1% (121) 
 
  100% (161) 100% (174) 100% (420) 100% (708) 
 
        
 
EU tone       
 
Predominantly negative 17.9% (21) 35.7% (46) 22.0% (44) 45.9% (107) 
 
Neutral/ambivalent 67.5% (79) 58.1% (75) 45.0% (90) 43.3% (101) 
 
Predominantly positive 14.5% (17) 6.2% (8) 33.0% (66) 10.7% (25) 
 
  100% (117) 100% (129) 100% (200) 100% (233) 
 
        
 
Government tone       
 
Predominantly negative 27.7% (23) 41.7% (55) 45.6% (47) 36.4% (90) 
 
Neutral/ambivalent 68.7% (57) 49.2% (65) 36.9% (38) 42.1% (104) 
 
Predominantly positive 3.6% (3) 9.1% (12) 17.5% (18) 21.5% (53) 
 
  100% (83) 100% (132) 100% (103) 100% (247) 
 
        
 
Populist/Eurosceptic 
opposition tone     
  
 
Predominantly negative 30.4% (14) 24.4% (33) 30.1% (25) 35.7% (82) 
 
Neutral/ambivalent 63.0% (29) 54.8% (74) 42.2% (35) 38.7 (89) 
 
Predominantly positive 6.5% (3) 20.7% (28) 27.7% (23) 25.7% (59) 
 
  100% (46) 100% (135) 100% (83) 100% (230) 
 
   
 
Table 2: Types of actor and tone towards the EU 
 
 EU European National Domestic 
 Germany UK Germany UK Germany UK 
Predominantly 
negative 
11.90% 
(7) 
41.00% 
(16) 
60.00% 
(15) 
60.00% 
(21) 
18.40% 
(14) 
43.30% 
(52) 
Neutral / ambivalent 47.50% 
(28) 
33.30% 
(13) 
20.00% 
(5) 
37.10% 
(13) 
46.10% 
(35) 
50.00% 
(60) 
Predominantly 
positive 
40.70% 
(24) 
25.60% 
(10) 
20.00% 
(5) 
2.90% (1) 35.50% 
(27) 
6.70% (8) 
Total 100% (59) 100% (39) 100% (25) 100% (35) 100% (76) 100% 
(120) 
 
Table 3: Type of conflict 
 
 Articles  Actors  
 Germany UK Germany UK 
EU Policies 6.2% (10) 4.0% (7) 8.0% (33) 4.1% (29) 
EU Politics 21.1% (34) 6.3% (11) 26.5% (110) 8.5% (60) 
EU Member Statea 18.6% (30) 1.7% (3) 16.1% (67) 8.8% (62) 
EU Polity 26.1% (42) 47.1% (82) 16.1% (67) 23.7% (168) 
National Policies 2.5% (4) 5.7% (10) 1.2% (5) 6.4% (45) 
National Politics 24.8% (40) 33.9% (59) 30.8% (128) 48.0% (340) 
National Polity .6% (1) 1.1% (2) 1.2% (5) .6% (4) 
Total 100% (161) 100% (174) 100% (415) 100% (708) 
a EU member state policies, politics and polity have been collapsed into one category. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Types of actor by party type 
 
 EU European 
National 
Domestic 
National 
Total (of party 
type) 
Germany     
Mainstream 100.0% (65) 56.9% (37) 83.9% (156) 81.6% (258) 
Radical/populist 0.0% (0) 43.1% (28) 16.1% (30) 18.3% (58) 
Total 100% (65) 100% (65) 100% (186) 100% 316 
UK     
Mainstream 50.7% (34) 62.7% (42) 73.1% (310) 69.1% (386) 
Radical/populist 49.3% (33) 37.3% (25) 26.9% (114) 30.8% (172) 
 100% (67) 100% (67) 100% (424) 100% (558) 
 
 
